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Frontiers of Progress: The Case of the
Westbank First Nation
Although a greater amount of attention
is being drawn in the direction of Aboriginal
forestryl in Canada, Aboriginal forestry
practitioners have to contend with the stereotype
that their relationship with the forest is centered
on spirituality. This romanticization of
Aboriginal relationships with forests gives the
Canadian state license to conceptualize
traditional Aboriginal lands as a productive,
opportunistic wilderness; a 'resource frontier.' In
her ethnography entitled Friction: An
Ethnography of Global Connections (2005),
Anna Tsing provides insightful discussion into
how we might think differently about the
concept of the frontier. For Tsing (2005:27),
frontiers are particular kinds of edges where "the
expansive nature of extraction comes into its
own. .. [F]rontiers create wilderness so that
some-and not others-may reap its rewards."
Moreover, frontiers confuse the boundaries of
law and alter rules that enable new economies of
profit as well as loss (Tsing 2005 :26-7).
Resource frontiers, in particular, 'free up' natural
resources by disengaging the land from local
inhabitants, allowing bureaucrats and
government officials to carry out corporate
capitalist expansion (Tsing 2005:28).
Tsing's discussion of 'resource frontier'
can be usefully applied to the context of the
Westbank First Nation and British Columbia
logging dispute and the subsequent resolution
which resulted in the Westbank First Nation
Self-Government Agreement (2003; hereafter
referred to as the Westbank Agreement). The
dispute between the Westbank First Nation and
the province of British Columbia specifically
relates to the 'freeing up' of West bank traditional
territory in ways that excluded the Westbank
First Nation from economic opportunities. The
provincial Crown 'imagined' the traditional
territory of the Westbank First Nation as free for
exploitation. When the Westbank resisted the
political project of the Crown, they retaliated by
asserting the right and title to their land. The
issue was resolved in 2003 through the
enactment of the Westbank First Nation Self-
1 In this context, 'Aboriginal forestry' simply refers to
forestry practices performed by Aboriginal peoples.
Government agreement. It is my contention that,
despite the implementation and subsequent
optimism surrounding the Agreement, the
Canadian state continues to conceptualize
Westbank traditional territories as a resource
frontier that they are entitled to, a 'space of
desire' which is open to exploration and
exploitation (Tsing 2005:32). Moreover, the
state has politically justified this
conceptualization by embedding it into the
Agreement itself. In this paper, I examine the
political and ecological backdrop that led to the
construction of this agreement. I also briefly
consider the role of the Canadian federal and
provincial governments within the realm of
Aboriginal forestry. In addition, I examine
specific government policies that justify the
conceptualization of Aboriginal space as a
resource frontier that is open to capitalist claims.
These policies are then examined within the
context of the Westbank Agreement.
Case Study
Aboriginal forestry is becoming
recognized as a fast growing section by Canadian
forest management companies (Parsons & Prest
2003:779). For Aboriginal forestry practitioners,
the forest is a source for building and
maintaining traditional ecological knowledge as
well as a means for providing greater economic
self-sufficiency (Parsons & Prest 2003:781).
The forestry dispute between the Westbank First
Nation2 and the Crown fits into this context as
the Westbank were fighting the government for
both rights to traditional territory and economic
gam.
The Westbank First Nation are a part of
the larger Okanagan Nation that is located in the
southern part of the province near Kelowna Be.
In the fall of 1999, the Westbank First Nation,
who had been unsuccessful in obtaining a
logging permit from the British Columbia
Ministry of Forests, began logging on Crown
land without a permit (Curran & M'Gonigle
1999:712). According to Beatty and Pemberton
of the Vancouver Sun (1999:2), the Westbank
First Nation claimed that the province had been
unwilling to recognize Native entitlement to
traditional territories. After 10 months of
2 In all of the sources that I examined, the Westbank First
Nation was treated as a homogenous group. As an
anthropologist, I am aware that there was likely to have been
internal fission within the group. Unfortunately, the sources I
examined have not provided me with adequate information to
explore the heterogeneity of the Westbank First Nation in this
paper.
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inaction and frustration, then-Chief Ron
Derrickson stated that it was important for
natives to assert their Aboriginal claim to the
land. Derrickson also pointed out that the
logging initiatives were done in an effort to
stimulate the Native economy (Beatty and
Pemberton 1999:3): "'[t]he harvesting of our
timber grew from frustration led on by the
province ignoring Aboriginal title and rights
under the Delgamuukw decision,,,3 (Derrickson
in Bonneau-Jack 1999: 1).
Despite mainstream backlash, the
Westbank First Nation was widely supported by
other Aboriginal groups: "As provincial officials
issued a stop work order, criticized the logging
as illegal, and talk of RCMP intervention began,
more and more First Nations and First Nations
organizations joined in an unprecedented show
of solidarity" (Bonneau-Jack 1999: 1). The show
of support from other First Nations communities
signaled a growing dissatisfaction with
provincial and federal use of traditional
territories (Curran & M'Gonigle 1999:712-13).
Steward Phillip, president of the Union of British
Columbia Indian Chiefs, echoed this sentiment:
We, as Native people, have an
undeniable right to participate
in the economic interests of the
province. .. Delgamuukw says
we are the owners of this land
and that must be fully
understood, respected and
implemented in all future
planning of resource extraction
(Phillip in Bonneau-Jack
1999:2).
On Oct 3,2003, it appeared as though
the Westbank First Nation won their right to
access their traditional lands and territory in
ways they saw fit: the Westbank First Nation
signed a self-government agreement which
superficially assigned the Westbank jurisdiction
over land management, resources, and language
and culture. Robert Nault, Minister of Indian
Affairs had this to say about the agreement:
The Westbank Self-
Government Agreement is a
significant achievement for
both our parties ... For one, it
will provide Westbank with
J Delgamuukw refers to a Supreme Court of Canada decision
which recognized that Aboriginal peoples had exclusive
rights to their traditional territories. A detailed discussion is
included further in this paper.
the tools it needs to make
decisions over its own affairs.
Second, it demonstrates that
the Government of Canada's
approach to negotiating self-
government in partnership with
First Nations produces real and
sustainable results (Nault
2001).
Westbank Chief Robert Louie was equally
optimistic:
For decades we at Westbank
First Nation have had to
contend with all the
restrictions and deficiencies of
the archaic federal Indian
Act ... At long last we have
been able to break that bond
and have successfully
negotiated the kind of
government necessary for us to
move forward and create
opportunities for membership
(Nault 2001.)
The above quotes illustrate the satisfaction of
both parties over the outcome of the Westbank
Agreement. However, a closer inspection of the
Agreement itself reveals underlying political
processes that undermine and restrict Westbank
access to land and resource management,
particularly with respect to logging. The
duplicitous and undercutting effects of the
Agreement are bound up in larger government
policies that justify state access to Aboriginal
resources. As such, it is necessary to briefly
outline the role that the Canadian federal and
provincial governments have played in Canadian
Aboriginal forestry before examining the specific
policies that are potentially detrimental to
Westbank self-government aims.
Background: The Role of Provincial and
Federal Governments
Within Canada, both federal and
provincial legislation dictates how Aboriginal
peoples may use traditional lands: "Section
91(24) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1867
assigns jurisdiction for 'Indians and lands
reserved for Indians' to the federal government.
Conversely, forest management comes under
provincial regulation (Curran & M'Gonigle
1999:717). These jurisdictions have traditionally
limited the ways in which Aboriginal peoples
may use land. In British Columbia, the province
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negotiates on the basis of a 'land selection'
model whereby the total land that can be held by
a First Nation in fee simple4 must be no more
than 5 per cent of the provincial land base
(Curran & M'Gonigle 1999:719 720).
Therefore, the scope of traditional land bases
continues to be restricted by the Crown.
As previously stated, the Westbank
First Nation logging dispute has highlighted the
importance of economic benefits for Aboriginal
peoples in the area of forest use and
management. For Aboriginal peoples, forests are
particularly important as 80 percent of the 603
First Nations of Canada inhabit productive forest
areas (Curran & M'Gonigle 1999:713).
Furthermore, of this 80 percent, more than one
third have over 1000 hectares of forest within the
boundaries of their reserves (ibid.). Despite the
growing awareness that Aboriginal people are
seeking to reap the socio-economic benefits of
forestry use, much of what is considered
'traditional Aboriginal land' is currently
managed by the provincial Crown (parsons &
Prest 2003:782). Parsons and Prest (ibid.) note
that "[Despite the ramifications of the
Delgamuukw decision, there] continues to be
confrontation in the forest sector between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, with
judgments coming from the courts." As
illustrated above, this has certainly been the case
with the Westbank First Nation. Moreover, the
current legal regime does not allow Aboriginal
peoples to access their land in ways that underlie
Aboriginal title. The combined federal and
provincial jurisdictions prevent Aboriginal
peoples from generating revenue from their
lands, especially with regards to logging (Curran
& M'Gonigle 1999:738). Parsons and Prest
(2003:782) note that collisions between
Aboriginal peoples and government authorities
are often catalyzed by issues including
Aboriginal rights and economic benefits.
Although large numbers of Aboriginal
communities are gaining access to Crown lands
through tenure arrangements, their involvement
in land use management continues to be minimal
(Parsons & Prest 2003:782). Asch and Zlotkin
(2002[1997]:208) further add that a fundamental
obstacle to the completion of land use
agreements has been disagreement over whether
settlements should contain wording that
extinguishes all or part of Aboriginal rights and
title. Currently, the federal government requires
4 A form of property in which the owner has outright and
unconditional disposal rights.
extinguishment as a condition for settling
outstanding land claims. Many Aboriginal
groups reject this condition and refuse to settle;
instead, they seek recognition and affIrmation of
Aboriginal rights and title (Asch & Zlotkin
1997:208).
In the case of the Westbank First Nation
Self-Government Agreement, the agreement
made between the Westbank and the Crown is
not constituted as a treaty as seen in section
4(a)5. However, the Agreement also states in
sections 6 and 7 that:
6. Nothing in this agreement or
legislation shall be construed
as limiting or restricting either
Party's position with respect to
aboriginal rights, title,
jurisdictions or interests.
7. Nothing in this Agreement
or the Legislation shall be
construed to abrogate or
derogate from aboriginal rights
recognized and affirmed by
section 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982. (Emphasis mine in
section 6).
These sections are noteworthy for several
reasons: While the Westbank Agreement is not
formally recognized as a treaty, the potential
remains for the restriction, if not the implicit
extinguishment of certain Aboriginal rights and
title. Section 6 allows the Crown to assert their
defmitions of Aboriginal rights and title, which
may vary from the Westbank definitions.
Moreover, while section 7 claims not to detract
from aboriginal rights and title that were
recognized by the Constitution Act, 1982, it
makes no mention of the effects of the
Delgamuukw decision (1997) on the assertion of
Aboriginal rights and title which came about, in
part, because the Constitution Act, 1982, was
problematic. However, before the potential
restrictions of government policy on the
Westbank Agreement are explored further, a
discussion which attends to the meaning of
Aboriginal rights and title within governmental
policy discourse must initially be addressed.
Aboriginal Rights and Title
Isaac (2003 :2) defmes Aboriginal rights
as the legal embodiment of Aboriginal peoples'
5 Section 4(a) of the Westbank Agreement states that ''This
Agreement shall not constitute a treaty. This Agreement is
without prejudice to treaty-making in British Columbia."
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claims to their traditional lands and their ability
to partake in traditional activities and customs.
Aboriginal title is the special legal interest that
Aboriginal people have towards those lands that
they have historically occupied. Although
Aboriginal title is defmed as a right to the land, it
is also considered a burden on the Crown's
underlying title to the land. According to the
Delgamuukw decision, which is discussed at
length below, Aboriginal title encompasses the
right to exclusive use and occupation of the land
for a variety of purposes, although these
purposes must not interfere with " the nature of
the Aboriginal group's attachment to that land"
(Delgamuukw v. B.C [1997] S.C.R ..para
140;145;117 in Isaac 2003:3). As is discussed
below in further detail, the government defmition
of Aboriginal rights and title is obfuscating.
Conversely, Aboriginal peoples have a very
certain definition of what is implied by
Aboriginal rights and title.
While the Canadian government
ambiguously defmes the concepts of Aboriginal
rights and title (Asch & Zlotkin 2002:212), Asch
and Zlotkin (1997:215) note that Aboriginal title
is a very certain concept among Aboriginal
peoples: "Aboriginal rights derive from the very
existence of Aboriginal people, communities,
and nations. [Moreover] Aboriginal rights and
title are self-defining and derive from sources
external to the Canadian legal system and
constitution" (Asch & Zlotkin 1997:215). In
essence, Aboriginal rights and title are the basis
for political and economic accommodations
between Canada and Aboriginal Nations.
The variations between Canadian state
and Aboriginal defmitions of Aboriginal rights
and title illustrate that these are flexible
categories and are defmed in a variety of ways
by a variety of actors. State conceptualizations
of Aboriginal rights and title, in particular, have
implications for how Aboriginal people may
manage their lands and resources. Oftentimes,
the exact nature of resource management is
open-ended and ambiguous.
Section 8 of the Westbank Agreement
effectively illustrates the ambiguous nature of
Aboriginal rights and title: "For greater certainty,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as
recognizing or denying any aboriginal rights
recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982." Therefore, if
Aboriginal rights and title are neither denied nor
affirmed, room is made for federal and
provincial governments to assert their political
power over what rights may be affirmed and
what rights may be denied. Indeed, both the
federal Canadian and B.C. provincial
governments have prioritized and maintained
their authority over Westbank affairs in sections
29, 30, 31, 35, and 40 of the Westbank
Agreement. Sections 29-31 affirm the priority of
federal law in certain conflicts, while section 35
asserts that the Westbank Agreement does not
limit the authority of Canada. More importantly,
section 40 states that the Westbank Agreement
does not affect Crown prerogatives and
immunities. Canadian state authority and policy
thus has the potential to affect the Westbank
First Nation in ways that are not in accordance
with their self-government aims. The particular
ways in which flexible policy affects the nature
of Aboriginal rights and title will come into play
later in the discussion. For now, it is important
to explore the nature of the Canadian
Constitution, 1982, and the Delgamuukw
decision [1997] in further detail.
Canadian Constitution 1982
Aboriginal treaty rights were explicitly
recognized and affirmed in 1982 in section 35 of
the Canadian Constitution. Since then, First
Nations have been fighting with the government
to have those rights defmed (Miller 2001:22).
Isaac (2003:271) outlines the conditions of
Aboriginal title as set forth in the Canadian
Constitution 1982:
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982
(1) The existing aboriginal
and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of
Canada are hereby
recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal
peoples of Canada"
includes the Indian, Inuit
and Metis peoples of
Canada.
(3) For greater certainty, in
subsection (1) "treaty
rights" includes rights that
now exist by way of land
claims agreements or may
be so acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, the
aboriginal and treaty
rights referred to in
subsection (1) are
guaranteed equally to
male and female persons.
TOTEM vol 142005-2006
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The applicability of section 35 to the Westbank
Agreement is unclear. In the first place, because
the Westbank Agreement is not considered a
. treaty, it begs the question of what rights are
being affirmed. Moreover, Isaac (2003:371)
notes that within the context of the Canadian
Constitution, 1982, "treaty rights" relate
specifically to hunting, fishing, trapping, and
mention nothing of forest management, i.e.
logging. This is especially problematic in the
case of the Westbank First Nation, as dialogue
was established between them and the federal
and provincial governments precisely because of
issues relating to logging. Although the
Delgamuukw decision is not actively used within
the Westbank Agreement, its implications on
Westbank resource management are nonetheless
implicit. In the initial dispute, then-Chief
Derrickson referred to the Delgamuukw decision
as justification for logging on Crown lands (see
above). The meaning of Aboriginal rights and
title, then, needs to be explored within this
context.
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
On December 11, 1997, the Supreme
Court of Canada handed down the Delgamuukw
decision which recognized that that Aboriginal
peoples have exclusive rights to their traditional
territories, including rights to contemporary uses
of resources (Miller 2001:22). The Delgamuukw
decision afftrmed oral historical evidence that
had been rejected in the 1993 trial presided over
by Chief Justice McEachern (Isaac 2003:9).
Moreover, the Delgamuukw decision
reconfirmed the uniqueness of Aboriginal title
that had been previously afftrmed in the
Canadian Constitution, 1982, i.e. "it is
inalienable [not transferable due to protection by
law]; it arises from the prior occupation of
Canada by Aboriginal peoples and their pre-
existing systems of law; and it is held
communally" (Curran & M'Gonigle 1999:723).
While perceived as a milestone in government
policy at the time, the Delgamuukw decision
represents a much lesser recognition of
Aboriginal rights and title than it claims (Miller
2001:24). Curran and M'Gonigle (1999:728-29)
state that:
More than two years after the
Supreme Court of Canada
handed down its expansive
afftrmation of Aboriginal title
in Delgamuukw, the law still
offers First Nations little more
than ... an ethereal promise of
no infringement of Aboriginal
rights. . . At the same time,
Aboriginal peoples have no
direct management control
over activities on traditional
lands except through
participation in the existing
tenure system ... the legislated
tenure system for industrial
logging often operates in direct
opposition to traditional
Aboriginal uses that are the
foundation of Aboriginal title.
These observations of the shortcomings
of the Delgamuukw decision, especially with
respect to forestry management, have direct
implications on the Westbank Agreement.
Although the Westbank have entered into a
relationship with the Canadian state that has been
verified through policy, the very nature of that
policy undermines their self-government
abilities. According to section 87 of the
Agreement, which lays out the encompassment
of title and interests in Westbank lands: "Title to
all Westbank Lands shall continue to be held in
the name of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Canada for the use and benefit of West bank First
Nations." As a consequence, Westbank land is
still technically controlled by the Canadian
government, and subsequently, government
interests. The precedence of government interest
in lands over those of the Westbank is
particularly evident in Part 12 of the agreement
which specifically relates to resource
management. Section 135 defines the scope of
Westbank jurisdiction over resources, which
includes "protection, conservation, management,
development and disposition of renewable
resources." Significantly omitted from this list is
jurisdiction over exploitation of resources.
Furthermore, section 135(c), with specific regard
to the forest management, states that Westbank
jurisdiction extends to "preservation and
management of the forest resource, including
forest enhancement and pest control."
Noticeably missing from these parameters is the
ability to exploit forest resources; the overall
Westbank objective is to preserve. Thus, the
management of forest ecology takes precedence
over the management of forest economy.
The designation of the Westbank First
Nation to the protection, rather than use, of
Westbank territory is further reiterated in section
148: "Westbank First Nation has jurisdiction in
TOTEM vol 14 2005-2006
Copyright © 2006 TOTEM: The UWO Journal of Anthropology
Donovan: Frontiers of Progress
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
relation to the protection and conservation of the
environment on Westbank Lands." Moreover,
section 150 states that in the event of a conflict
between federal law and Westbank law over
Issues of environmental protection and
conservation, federal law prevails. The
limitations placed on Westbank environmental
jurisdiction and land use is especially significant
due to the sociopolitical milieu from which the
Westbank self-government agreement arose. For
example, if the Westbank First Nation pursued
industrial logging for economic benefits, they
could be in conflict with the environmental
interests of the federal government.
Underlying these issues of access to
land and jurisdiction over resources is the
assumption that the Canadian state holds
underlying title to all of Canada (Asch & Zlotkin
2002:211). Aboriginal title is characterized
under Canadian law as a form of property right,
and as such, is a burden on the underlying Crown
title (Asch & Zlotkin 2002:212). Despite the
recognition of Aboriginal rights and title by
section 35 of the Canadian constitution, the exact
nature and scope of Aboriginal rights and title
remain obscurely defmed (Asch and Zlotkin
2002:212): "Federal policy, therefore,
conceptualized Aboriginal rights and title as
uncertain, especially 'with respect to the legal
status of lands and resources'" (Federal policy
1993:5 in Asch and Zlotkin 1997:212). The
intangibility of Aboriginal rights and title is
attributed to a lack of political agreement
between Aboriginal peoples and the state and has
resulted in '''a barrier to economic development
for all Canadians and has hindered full
participation of Aboriginal peoples in land and
resource management'" (Federal policy 1993:5
in Asch and Zlotkin 1997:212). However, while
federal policy may blame Aboriginal peoples for
stagnation over issues of resource management,
limitations placed on access to resources have
been legalized through such clauses as the
'inherent limit' of Aboriginal title, and the
justification for infringement.
Inherent Limit of Aboriginal Title
The Delgamuukw decision, while
affirming Aboriginal rights and title,
simultaneously contains a number of elements
that potentially restrict the Aboriginal freedom to
maneuver. These elements are listed by McNeil
(2001:101) as:
1. the source of Aboriginal title;
2. the proprietary status of Aboriginal
title;
3. the content of Aboriginal title;
4. the inherent limit on Aboriginal
title;
5. the communal nature of Aboriginal
title; and
6. the inalienability of Aboriginal
title.
For the purposes of this discussion, the fourth
element of Aboriginal title - its inherent limit -
will be explored further.
McNeil (2001:116) notes that the
'inherent limit' clause directly affects the ways
in which Aboriginal peoples may use the land,
which is ultimately governed by the ways that
Aboriginal peoples used land at the time the
Crown asserted its sovereignty. In his
explication of 'inherent law,' Chief Justice
Lamer states that:
[L]ands subject to aboriginal
title cannot be put to such uses
as may be irreconcilable with
the nature of the occupation of
that land and the relationship
that the particular group has
had with the land which
together have given rise to
aboriginal title in the first place
(Delgamuukw note 1 at 1089 in
McNeil 2001:116).
The limit, therefore, is on land use.
Chief Justice Lamer adds that land uses which
are threatening to future generations of uses are,
by their very nature, excluded from the rubric of
Aboriginal title (Delgamuukw 1089 in McNeil
2001:117).
The limitation of Aboriginal title as
defmed by the Court fails to acknowledge that
Aboriginal nations may want to engage in land-
based activities that are culturally appropriate in
the present day (McNeil 2001:118). In the case
of the Westbank First Nation, these
contemporary land-based activities include the
right to log on their traditional territories. This
Aboriginal right, as defmed by Chief Derrickson
(see above), is noticeably missing from the
Westbank Agreement. Furthermore, in order for
Aboriginal nations to manage resources in ways
that are incompatible with uses during the time
of Crown sovereignty, the Delgamuukw decision
holds that Aboriginal peoples must surrender
their lands to the Crown in order to be able to do
so (Delgamuukw note 1 at 1091 in McNeil
2001: 118). Among other things, this restriction
limits the decision-making of Aboriginal nations
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with respect to their lands and undermines their
capacity to undertake economic developments
that will allow them to become self-sufficient
communities (McNeil 2001: 118-19).
What this really appears to
mean is that Aboriginal title,
while not limited to Aboriginal
uses of land at the time of
Crown sovereignty, is still
limited by those uses. It also
has to be kept in mind that
'aboriginal title encompasses
the right to exclusive use and
occupation' [Delgamuukw
1083 emphasis add€(d].
(McNeil 2001:119).
Limitations on Aboriginal land uses that are
direct consequences of an indigenous
representation that is frozen in colonial time and
space is especially prevalent in the Westbank
Agreement. This can be seen in my earlier
discussion on the delegation of Westbank First
Nations to environmental conservation where the
emphasis is on what the Westbank First Nations
may protect and conserve as opposed to what
they can exploit. Clearly, then, the Westbank
still have limited access to resources despite the
self-government Agreement. Through existing
policy, the Canadian state has codified its ability
to access Westbank resources within the
Agreement itself. Another clause, which allows
the government to legally infringe on Aboriginal
rights and title, will now be discussed. It is my
contention that this clause is also manifested
within the Westbank Agreement.
Infringement
Despite the affmnation of Aboriginal
rights and title by both the Canadian
Constitution, 1982, and the Delgamuukw
decision, the government has embedded within
these laws legal acts and decisions that allow the
Crown to legally infringe upon Aboriginal rights
and title. In the Canadian Constitution, 1982,
the Court set out a method of analysis to
determine if section 35(1) had been infringed by
a government regulation, act, or decision. The
analysis is made up of two elements: (1) the
infringement test, which pertains to Aboriginal
peoples, and (2) the justification analysis, which
allows the court to legally justify the reasons for
its infringement (Isaac 2003:371).
In the case of the infringement test, the
onus is on Aboriginal peoples to prove that an
infringement of an Aboriginal right or treaty
right has occurred (Isaac 2003:372). This clause
shifts the position of Aboriginal peoples from
defendants to plaintiffs as they are challenging
Crown actions. Conversely, the justification test
shifts the onus to the Crown to demonstrate that
the infringement is justified (ibid.). The
language used to describe the infringement and
justification tests is particularly noteworthy. In
the case of Aboriginal peoples, they must prove
that wrongdoing had occurred. The Crown,
however, does not need to be accountable for
their actions. Justification is an easier test for the
Crown as there are already several legislative
objectives built into Canadian policy that
validate various forms of infringement. Valid
legislative objectives that constitute infringement
include: "conserving and managing a natural
resource, preventing harm to the general
populous and Aboriginal people (ensuring
safety), other 'compelling and substantial'
objectives, 'important general public objectives'"
(Isaac 2003:373).
Moreover, in the case of Delgamuukw, the Court
stated that the following objectives were valid
for justifying an infringement under section
35(1):
"[D]evelopment of agriculture,
forestry, mining, and
hydroelectric power, the
general economic development
of the interior of British
Columbia, protection of the
environment or endangered
species, the building of
infrastructure and the
settlement of foreign
populations'" (Delgamuukw v.
B.C. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010
note 51 at para. 165 in Isaac
2003:373, emphasis mine).
Clearly, the range of justifiable infringements is
expansive. Thus, the Canadian state has ample
justifications for infringement. Moreover, if
Aboriginal peoples attempt to prove that their
rights have been infringed upon, there is little left
that Canadian policy has not legitimated. The
justification test, by its very nature, renders the
infringement test useless.
Built into the Westbank First Nation
agreement are allowances whereby the Canadian
state may infringe upon Aboriginal rights.
Under the subject heading "Expropriation for
Community Purposes," section 105 states that
"Westbank First Nation has jurisdiction in
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relation to expropriation of interest in Westbank:
Lands for a Community purpose subject to the
following principles ... (b) the following interests
in Westbank: Lands are not subject to Westbank:
expropriations... (ii) interests in Westbank:
Lands held by Canada." Moreover, section 106
goes on to state that Westbank: jurisdiction over
their lands shall not prevent access to "those
persons with rights or interests in Westbank:
lands." In accordance with Delgarnuukw (see
above), the above sections allow the Canadian
government to justifiable infringe upon
Westbank: title.
More evidently, under the aptly titled
"Federal Expropriation," Canada agrees that, as a
general principle, Westbank: lands will not be
expropriated (section Ill), however,
expropriation is justifiable "and necessary for a
federal public purpose that serves the national
interest" (section 113). Expropriation will be
granted if: "(a) alternatives to expropriation have
been considered and such alternatives are not
reasonably feasible; (b) there are no non-
Westbank: Lands reasonably available; ... (e)
Westbank: First Nation has been provided with
information relevant to the expropriation"
(section 114).
Discussion
By amalgamating flexible policy that
prioritizes state access to and control over
traditional resources within the Westbank:
Agreement, the Canadian state undermines the
self-government and economic potential of the
Westbank: First Nation. The Canadian state
interests undercut the Westbank: Agreement by
refusing to allocate Westbank: territory solely to
the Westbank: First Nation. As such, Westbank:
traditional territory retains its status as a resource
frontier, a 'space of desire' which is open to the
exploration and exploitation of capitalist
Canadian agendas. (Tsing 2005:32).
Government definitions of Aboriginal rights and
title, the 'inherent limit' of these defmitions, and
justifications for infringement have allowed for
the 'freeing up' of Westbank: space in ways that
are conducive to state control over access to land
and resource management, particularly with
regards to logging.
In this context, little has changed
between the climax of disputes in 1999 and its
subsequent 'resolution in October of 2003. If
anything, opening up the Westbank: economy
through forestry has become more problematic
due to its significant omission from the
Westbank: Agreement. More importantly, the
Canadian ViSion of the Westbank: 'resource
frontier' has been reified through policy: the
Westbank: vision of a land separated from
Canadian control (see above) has been undercut
by Canadian state visions of frontier progress
(Tsing 2005:31). Thus, the apparent localism of
the Canadian state masks an overarching
nationalist agenda in which Aboriginal territory,
although inhabited by people with their own
visions of economic prosperity, remains a
capitalist resource frontier that is left open to
exploration and exploitation~ a frontier of
progress; a productive and opportunistic
'wilderness' .
Works Cited
Asch, Michael and Norman Zlotkin. 2002.
"AffIrming Aboriginal Title: A New
Basis for Comprehensive Claims
Negotiations." In Aboriginal Treaty
Rights in Canada: Essays on Law,
Equality, and Respect for Difference.
Asch, (ed.). Vancouver: UBC Press.
Beatty, Jim and Kim Pemberton. Consulted
November 9,2005.
Defiant Westbank: Nation Begins
Logging Crown Land in BC, World
Wide Web Page, url:
http://forests.org/ archi vel canada/westbe
gl.htm. 1999.
Bonneau-Jack, Tracey. Consulted November 18,
2005. B.C. Logging Issue at a Boil.
World Wide Web Page, url:
http://portaec.net/library lfirstnations/wi
ndspeaker_article_bc.html In press
1999.
Curran, Deborah, and Michael M'Gonigle. 1999.
Aboriginal Forestry: Community
Management as Opportunity and
Imperative. Osgoode Hall Law Journal.
37(4):712-744.
Isaac, Thomas. 2002. Aboriginal Law:
Commentary, Cases and Materials.
Third Edition Saskatoon, S.K.: Purich
Publishing Ltd.
McNeil, Kent. 1999. The Onus of Proof of
Aboriginal Title. Osgoode Hall Law
Journal. 37(4):775-803.
TOTEM vol 14 2005-2006
Copyright © 2006 TOTEM: The UWO Journal of Anthropology
Totem: The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 14 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/totem/vol14/iss1/2
on Indigenous Rights in Canada and
Australia. Native Law Centre:
University of Saskatchewan.
McNeil, Kent. 2002. "The Meaning of
Aboriginal
Title." In Aboriginal Treaty Rights in
Canada:
Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect
for Difference. Asch, (ed.). Vancouver:
UBC Press.
Mills, Antonia. 2000. Three Years After
Delgamuukw: The Continuing Battle
Over Respect for
First Nations Interests to Their
Traditional Territories and Rights to
Work Their Resources. Anthropology of
Work Review. 21(2):22-29.
Nault, Robert. Consulted November 18, 2005.
Westbank Self Govemment First Nation
Agreement. Wodd Wide Web Page ud:
www.turtleisland.org/discussionlviewto
pic.php?p=2865. Posted May 6, 2001.
Parsons, Reginald, and Gordon Prest. 2003.
Aboriginal Forestry in Canada. The
Forestry Chronicle. July/August.
79(4):779-784.
Tsing, Anna. 2005. Friction: An Ethnography of
Global Connections. New Jersey, N.Y.:
Princeton University Press.
Westbank First Nation. 2002. Westbank First
Nation Self-Government Agreement.
Ottawa, O.N.: Minister ofIndian
Affairs and Northern Development.
Donovan: Frontiers of Progress
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
